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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3046 
 ___________ 
 
 ANGEL ALFONSO GARCIA URAGA;  
 MILUSKA GUERRERO, 
        Petitioners 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A088-230-949, A088-230-947) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 11, 2012 
 Before:  FISHER, WEIS and BARRY, Circuit 
 (Opinion filed:  April 13, 2012) 
Judges 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Before us is a timely petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
decision denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider.  For the following reasons, we 
will deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part. 
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I. 
 Petitioners Angel Alfonso Garcia Uraga (“Garcia”) and Miluska Guerrero 
(“Guererro”) are husband and wife.  He is a native and citizen of Mexico, she a native 
and citizen of Peru; he was charged with removability for entering the United States 
without inspection (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)), while she was charged with overstaying 
her visa (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)); he applied for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b), while she requested voluntary departure.1  Administrative Record 
(A.R.) 435–42, 471–72, 519–20.   The presiding Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief, 
determining (inter alia) that the petitioners had not shown that their daughter Arianna, a 
United States citizen, would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if they 
were to be removed from the United States.  A.R. 64; see also
 The petitioners pursued a direct appeal with the BIA, arguing that the IJ “engaged 
in very minimal analysis” and “abused his discretion in not considering the relevant 
[hardship] factors” described by BIA precedent.  A.R. 38–40.  The factors cited in the 
appellate brief related almost exclusively to Garcia’s ability to find meaningful work in 
Mexico, as well as to Garcia’s close connection to the United States (and his comparable 
lack thereof to Mexico).  
 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).   
See, e.g.
                                                 
1  While Guererro is ostensibly participating in this petition for review, no relief relating 
to the denial of voluntary departure is requested (or, for that matter, was implicated by 
the motion for reconsideration), and we accordingly will not discuss the matter further. 
, A.R. 37, 39.  To the extent that the brief discussed 
Arianna, it noted only that she was “unfamiliar[] with the Spanish language,” and posited 
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that her quality of life would be adversely affected by her father’s “return to subsistence 
farming” in Mexico.  A.R. 39–40.  Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, as the BIA 
decided that Garcia had “not met the high threshold required to show exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship.”  A.R. 25 (decision dated Apr. 8, 2011). 
 Garcia did not petition for review of this decision; instead, he timely requested that 
the BIA reconsider its outcome, as it had allegedly “overlooked” pertinent facts.  A.R. 14.  
The evidence in question included medical reports stating that Arianna suffered from an 
assortment of maladies.  See, e.g., A.R. 16.  Garcia also alleged that the BIA failed to 
address an inconsistency in the IJ’s determination of the petitioners’ ability to stay 
together as a couple, given their differing countries of citizenship.  See, e.g., A.R. 17.  
Despite being addressed to the BIA, the motion for reconsideration primarily attacked the 
underlying IJ decision.  Concluding that the motion did “not identif[y] any error of fact or 
law in the Board’s previous detailed decision,” the BIA denied relief.  A.R. 3 (decision 
dated July 20, 2011).  This petition for review, which was timely filed from the denial of 
reconsideration only,2
II. 
 followed on July 28, 2011.  
 The Government argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider this petition for 
review.  Br. for Respondent 14; see also In re Knapper
                                                 
2  See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995) (the finality of a removal order is not 
affected by the subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider); Castro v. Att’y Gen., No. 10-
3234, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 456530, at *5 (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2012). 
, 407 F.3d 573, 580 n.15 (3d Cir. 
2005) (observing that a Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction before reaching 
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the merits of a case).  In the context of petitions for review of BIA decisions, a court of 
appeals lacks jurisdiction over denials of “discretionary relief,” a category that explicitly 
encompasses applications for cancellation of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); 
Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e lack 
jurisdiction to review . . . whether the [agency was] correct in determining that [the 
petitioner did] not meet the hardship requirements for cancellation of deportation.”).  
Reconsideration motions fare the same, so long as “the question presented is essentially 
the same discretionary issue originally decided.”  Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 
600 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Alzainati v. Holder, 568 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(collecting cases in the context of motions to reopen).  Despite this jurisdictional 
limitation, we may nevertheless review “constitutions claims or questions of law raised 
upon a petition for review.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 
F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 97–98 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Thus, to the extent that we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we review 
whether the BIA, in exercising its discretion, violated a constitutional provision or other 
rule of law.  See Borges v. Gonzales
III. 
, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 Garcia argues first that the BIA’s merits decision was incorrect, and thus that it 
erred by denying reconsideration.  However, the “errors” that he points to are, for the 
most part, errors allegedly made by the IJ; indeed, Garcia’s motion for reconsideration 
also primarily cited IJ errors.  As a motion for reconsideration must “state the reasons for 
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the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision,” 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(b)(1) (emphasis added), we agree with the BIA that Garcia failed to “identify any 
error of fact or law in the Board’s previous decision.”  A.R. 3 (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, the BIA correctly applied the applicable standard in ruling on the 
reconsideration motion. 
 Garcia also suggests that the BIA erred in ignoring information pertaining to 
Arianna’s psychological evaluation.  To the extent that Garcia asks us to address the 
agency’s denial of discretionary relief, we lack jurisdiction to review this claim.  To the 
extent that he alleges a failure to comply with the governing regulations or law pertaining 
to motions for reconsideration, we agree with the Government that Garcia’s claim suffers 
from a fatal flaw: he failed to raise the issue of the psychological evaluation on direct 
appeal.  As the BIA was not made aware of any problems with the use of the report on 
direct appeal, it did not err in declining to reconsider on this ground. 
 Finally, Garcia argues that the “principles of fundamental fairness were violated” 
by the BIA’s decision, because the IJ “failed to fully consider the exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship” that Arianna would suffer.  While clothed in the language of 
the Constitution, this claim appears to be an attempt to elicit our review of the BIA’s 
discretionary determination, which (as stated supra) we lack jurisdiction to do.  See 
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen.
      IV. 
, 483 F.3d 184, 188–89 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we lack jurisdiction over the majority of this petition 
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for review.  To the extent that we have jurisdiction, we conclude that the BIA did not 
abuse its discretion and made no error of law in rejecting the petitioners’ motion for 
reconsideration.  Accordingly, the petition for review will be dismissed in part and denied 
in part. 
  
